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Th   is article attempts to explain changes and continuity in the developmental welfare states in Korea 
and Taiwan Province of China (hereafter Taiwan) within the East Asian context. It ﬁ  rst elaborates 
two strands of welfare developmentalism (selective vs. inclusive), and establishes that the welfare 
state in those countries fell into the selective category of developmental welfare states before the 
Asian economic crisis of 1997. Secondly, this paper argues that the policy reform toward an inclusive 
welfare state in Korea and Taiwan was triggered by the need for structural reform in the economy. 
Lastly, this paper argues that the idea of an inclusive developmental welfare state should be explored 
in the wider context of economic and social development.
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Huck-ju Kwon
Th   is paper attempts to explain changes and continuity in the developmental welfare states in Korea and 
Taiwan within the East Asian context. Th   e welfare states2 in these two economies have undergone signiﬁ  -
cant changes since the Asian economic crisis of 1997-1998. Th   ese changes seem to counter the neo-liberal 
argument that market driven globalization renders the welfare state of marginal importance in economic 
life (e.g. Beck, 2000; Ohmae, 1995). Th   ere have been counter-arguments to this assertion, but the analysis 
is fairly based on European experience (e.g. Pierson, 1998). Th   e welfare reforms in Korea and Taiwan have 
also strengthened state institutions and the welfare state in particular amid instability and ﬂ  exibility in the 
globalized market. Nevertheless, political and economic dynamics in these countries diﬀ  er from those in Eu-
ropean countries. What are the underlying dynamics of such reform and are there policy implications in the 
development context? To answer these questions, it is necessary to adopt a developmental perspective as well 
as a social policy approach, since social policy in these countries has been established as part of the overall 
framework of economic development.
Th   rough this uniﬁ  ed approach, this paper will argue that the welfare reforms in Korea and Taiwan have point-
ed toward a socially inclusive welfare state while maintaining their developmental credentials. Th   is paper will 
ﬁ  rst elaborate two strands of welfare developmentalism in order to capture the changing nature of the welfare 
state in East Asia. It will then explain why and how the welfare states in Korea and Taiwan underwent policy 
reform, drawing on a proposition derived from the concept of the developmental welfare state. In order to put 
the analysis in the East Asian context, this paper will, where appropriate, refer to the experiences of Singapore 
and Hong Kong, where the welfare state remain largely unchanged. Lastly, this paper will reﬂ  ect policy impli-
cations of the East Asian experience in the wider context of economic and social development.
Th   e success of the rapid economic development in these two countries was due largely to the 
developmental state, which played a strategic role in the process of industrialization (see Johnson, 1982; 
White, 1988; Woo-Cumings, 1999). However, it was not just economic policy but also social policy that was 
institutionalized so as to be able to play a part in the overall strategy for economic development. Hort and 
Kuhnle (2000:167-168) showed that East Asian countries introduced the ﬁ  rst social security programmes 
at lower levels of socio-economic development than the European countries. Th   is suggests that East Asian 
countries adopted the social welfare programmes as policy instruments for economic development. Good-
man and White (1998: 17) highlighted the characteristics of the East Asian welfare states that were incor-
porated in the state developmental strategy: a development ideology that subordinated welfare to economic 
eﬃ   ciency, discouraged dependence on the state, promoted private source of welfare, and diverted the ﬁ  nan-
cial resources of social insurance to investment in infrastructure.
1 Th   is paper was originally prepared as part of the UNRISD project on ‘Social Policy in a Development Context’. Th  e 
author is grateful to Th   andika Mkandawire, Shahra Razavi and Justin MacDermott for insightful discussions during 
the preparation of the paper and has also beneﬁ  ted from comments by Sarah Cook, Chua Beng Huat, Ito Peng, Joe 
Wong, Ilcheong Yi and M Ramesh at a Bangkok workshop in June 2003 and Evelyn Huber and John Myles at the 
Research Committee C 19 Conference in August 2003. A slightly revised version has been published in Development 
and Change, 36 (3). Th   e usual caveats apply.
2 Th   e welfare state refers here to the set of social policies and institutions that aim to protect citizens from social 
contingencies, poverty and illness, but it does not necessarily mean that the high level of well-being of citizens is 
achieved nor that all citizens have access to social beneﬁ  ts.2  DESA Working Paper No. 40
East Asia and two strands of welfare developmentalism
Th   is preoccupation with economic development led to the welfare state being predominantly composed 
of social insurance programmes for industrial workers, in which people were required to pay contributions 
prior to entitlement to social beneﬁ  ts. As a result, only selected groups of people had access to social pro-
tection, while leaving the vulnerable section of the population outside the system. To avoid a demand for 
universal entitlement, the state did not provide funding for the welfare programmes, but enforced the rules, 
formal and informal, which regulated the payment of contributions for social beneﬁ  ts by companies and 
their employees. Th   e social insurance programmes were operated by quasi-governmental agencies, working at 
arms-length from the government, but not, strictly speaking, a part of the government.
Because of the selectivity of the system, the East Asian welfare state had its inevitable downside. 
Since social policy programmes covered mainly industrial workers, the welfare states tended to reinforce 
socioeconomic inequalities. Kwon (1997) pointed out that the lion’s share of redistribution through social 
policies went to high-income earners, reﬂ  ecting the fact that wage earners in large-scale businesses and state 
sector employees were the ﬁ  rst group of people covered by social policy programmes. Th   e vulnerable people 
in society not only suﬀ  ered because of their diﬃ   cult situation but were also stigmatized by being excluded 
from the welfare state. Th   e authoritarian government maintained a regressive welfare system and suppressed 
dissenting voices. Th   ese characteristics of the East Asian welfare state are well summarized by the notion 
of the developmental welfare state, where elite policy makers set economic growth as the fundamental 
goal, pursue a coherent strategy to achieve it, and use social policy as an instrument for attaining that goal 
(Gough, 2001).
Of course, the concept of the developmental welfare state3 is a theoretical construct, aimed at 
capturing its distinctive features. Th   e welfare states in individual East Asian economies have evolved as their 
socio-economic structures have changed, for example, through the process of democratization and indus-
trialization. National Health Insurance in Korea, for instance, was extended to cover the entire population 
in 1988-1989. In Taiwan’s case, National Health Insurance was introduced in 1995 with a central manage-
ment system. Th   e democratization of politics played an important part in these changes, resulting in similar, 
but diﬀ  erent health systems in Korea and Taiwan. Singapore developed a welfare state that was anchored 
in a Central Provident Fund, and Malaysia implemented its New Economic Policy, which aimed mainly 
to redistribute economic resources along ethnic lines while developing its own Employees Provident Fund. 
Hong Kong recently established a similar mandatory provident scheme, in addition to welfare programmes, 
predominantly based on the idea of public assistance by the state. Th   ese welfare states originated during Brit-
ish colonial rule and were inﬂ  uenced in subsequent periods by nation-building eﬀ  orts. Given the fact that 
they took such diﬀ  erent paths, however, the developmental aspect of these welfare states is as strong as in 
their counterparts in Northeast Asia.
Th   e developmental welfare state was tested in terms of its eﬀ  ectiveness as a social protection system 
during the Asian economic crisis of 1997-1998, which exposed its weaknesses. For example, during the eco-
nomic crisis in Korea, one of the hardest-hit countries, it was very clear that the welfare state could not cope 
with the sudden rise in unemployment, because it had been based on the assumption of full employment 
3  In a similar vein, Holliday uses the term ‘productivist welfare regimes’ when he argues that the East Asian welfare 
regimes constitute a fourth welfare regime (Holliday 2000). Th   is article uses the concept of the developmental welfare 
state partly because it allows us to examine the political, economic and social context of the welfare state in East Asia 
and partly because it enable us to draw on the rich literature of development studies that has elaborated the concept of 
the developmental state.Transforming the developmental welfare states in East Asia          3
and therefore, minimal support for the unemployed. While the economy grew fast, the number of the unem-
ployed was small, and those who were unemployed relied on their families or on their savings as a safety net. 
During the economic crisis, the welfare state that had focused on workers employed in the formal sectors did 
not help those who lost their jobs.
As in Taiwan and Singapore, the public assistance programmes, which were based on a very low 
level of means-tested criteria, were not available to them in times of need. In response to this situation, the 
Korean government launched a range of temporary public works projects and extended the Employment 
Insurance Programme. After the worst phase of the economic crisis had passed, a new public assistance 
programme, the Minimum Living Standard Guarantee, was introduced. Th   is programme recognized entitle-
ment to beneﬁ  ts as a social right and raised the level of beneﬁ  ts according to the relative concept of poverty, 
which is an important departure from the welfare rationale of the past. In Taiwan the Employment Insur-
ance Programme, which functioned mainly as unemployment insurance, was ﬁ  rst introduced in 1999 in 
response to the rise in the unemployment rate since the late 1990s. National Health Insurance, introduced in 
1995, had already signalled a new direction for the welfare state development. It was a universal programme, 
covering the entire population, and the government contributed a part of the funding, not only for public 
employees but also for farmers and the self-employed.
Considering that the developmental welfare state is based on the idea of discouraging people from 
dependence on the state, while providing necessary beneﬁ  ts for those working in the productive sectors, 
these welfare reforms reﬂ  ect important changes. How do we explain these changes? Are these changes in the 
developmental welfare state pointing in a new direction that will lead to a diﬀ  erent path from that of the 
past? Kwon has raised the question whether the welfare state in East Asia is moving beyond welfare devel-
opmentalism (Kwon, 2002). Changes have taken place not only in social welfare programmes, but also in 
the politics of social policy. Highlighting changes in the politics of social policy in which diﬀ  erent groups 
of social actors are actively engaged in social policy making, Wong uses the notion of ‘mainstreaming social 
policy’ in politics (Wong, 2004). However, Kwon and Wong remain cautious on whether the clear shift, us-
ing Titmuss’ term, to the institutional welfare state has not taken place. A simple answer of ‘no’ to the ques-
tion of the shift needs to be equally tentative, since there have been important changes in the developmental 
welfare state.
In contrast to Korea and Taiwan, the governments in Singapore and Hong Kong did not carry out 
major reforms in social policy. Th   ere has been no major reform in the Central Provident Fund in Singapore. 
Although the Mandatory Provident Fund was introduced in 2000, there was no big shake-up of the wel-
fare state in Hong Kong. On the contrary, the Hong Kong government tried to check the expansion of the 
welfare state after the hand-over in 1997 (Pearson, 2003). Th   e welfare state in Singapore and Hong Kong 
shows strong continuity. What are the underlying factors of these diﬀ  erent responses among the East Asian 
countries?
To capture these changes and continuities, it is necessary to elaborate the concept of the develop-
mental welfare state, especially its political, economic and social aspects. It is important to recognize that 
the developmental use of social policy is not particularly new, if one looks back to the history of the welfare 
state. Th   e most notable example is Bismarck’s social policy in the 1880s (Rimlinger, 1971), which sought to 
facilitate industrialization through social insurance programmes, and at the same time to undermine political 
support for the socialist movement in Prussia. Bismarckian social policy did not attach equal importance to 
the intrinsic goals of social policy such as human well-being, social justice and redistribution. Social policy 4  DESA Working Paper No. 40
was only conceived as instrumental to economic and political objectives. In this respect, the welfare states in 
East Asia are clearly in line with the Bismarckian concept.
Th   ere has also been another strand in the developmental use of social policy. An early example of 
this type is the Scandinavian experiment with active labour market policy in the 1930s (Dahl, Dropping and 
Lodemel, 2001). While providing income maintenance, this policy was intended to provide the recipients 
with the necessary skills that would enable them to enter the labour market, to make their own living and 
subsequently to contribute to economic development. Th   is strand of welfare developmentalism was further 
elaborated by the United Nations and its specialized agencies in the late 1960s and 1970s. For example, 
in 1966, the United Nations Economic and Social Council passed a resolution in which it emphasized the 
interrelated character of economic and social factors and the importance of incorporating social development 
into economic development in order to achieve a better standard of living.
Th   is resolution was developed in more detail by a group of experts on social policy. Th   e chairman of 
the group of experts was Gunnar Myrdal, who argued for a uniﬁ  ed approach to social and economic plan-
ning in developing countries. Th   e group criticized the tendency in economics to draw a distinct line between 
economic and social phenomena, separating social development from economic development (UNDESA, 
1971: 4). It argued that social factors, such as excessive concentration of wealth and income, inequalities in 
educational opportunities and inegalitarian social and power structures, impede development and should be 
dealt with by social policy. In other words, economic development requires social policy.
Th   e experts went on to propose four principles of social policy, which could be regarded as the core 
of the second strand of welfare developmentalism: (1) to leave no important section of the population outside 
the scope of change and development; (2) to make it a principal objective to activate a wider sector of the 
population and to ensure its participation in development; (3) to accept and aim at social equity as being 
morally important, as well as a signiﬁ  cant element in increasing long-term economic eﬃ   ciency; and (4) to 
give high priority to the development of human potential, especially that of children, by preventing malnutri-
tion during their early years and by providing health services and equal opportunities (UNDESA, 1971: 11).
Th   is UN initiative, however, failed to have a signiﬁ  cant impact on policy making due to the world-
wide economic recession in the 1970s. Th   e ascendancy of neoliberalism in the 1980s also prevented this 
strand of welfare developmentalism from inﬂ  uencing development thinking. Yet, some scholars continued 
their research on ways in which economic development and social development could go hand-in-hand (see 
Midgley, 1982; Midgley, 1995), and some of the UN agencies such as United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (1990) and the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, (2000) have attempted 
to reinvigorate the idea of welfare developmentalism.
Th   e key principles of the second strand of welfare developmentalism are productivism, universal 
social investment and democratic governance (which will be referred to as ‘inclusive welfare developmental-
ism’), while the Bismarckian strand has features of productivism, selective social investment and authori-
tarianism (referred to as ‘selective welfare developmentalism’). If the welfare states in East Asia fall under the 
selective type of the developmental welfare state, will the recent changes transform the welfare state in Korea 
and Taiwan into the inclusive type? What are the driving forces for such a transformation, if such transfor-
mations have really taken place? What are the institutional advantages and drawbacks that Korea and Taiwan 
have experienced in the process of change?Transforming the developmental welfare states in East Asia          5
Before we try to answer these questions, it is necessary to make it clear what we mean by the devel-
opment state, since the developmental welfare states, either selective or inclusive, are in fact discussed in the 
context of the developmental state with particular attention to social policy. We deﬁ  ne a developmental state 
as a state that plays a strategic role in economic development with a bureaucracy that is given suﬃ   cient scope 
to take initiatives and operate eﬀ  ectively (Johnson, 1999). Here, economic development is given priority 
over other spheres of public policy, and the national economy as a whole has priority over the comparative 
advantage of particular industries. Th   is is a minimalist deﬁ  nition, compared to the conventional one, which 
also carries with it a heavy load of economic, political and social implications.
Although the developmental state has shown an aﬃ   nity with authoritarian politics, we do not as-
sume that the developmental state is intrinsically opposed to democracy, just as the leading commentators 
have never denied the possibility of democratic politics within the developmental state (Johnson, 1999; 
White, 1998; White, 1988).4 We also do not assume that the welfare state within such a paradigm should 
be a selective one. However, our minimal deﬁ  nition suggests that the overarching economic goal deﬁ  nes the 
nature of the welfare state. Of course, this link is not automatic, but is intermediated by the politics of each 
country. Th   e hypothesis arising from our conception of the developmental state is that once the overarching 
goal of economic policy is reset, other public policies including social policy will be readjusted in line with 
the new policy paradigm.
In the remaining part of this paper, we will argue that the shift in the overall goal of economic policy 
from extensive growth based on cheap labour to economic competitiveness based on high quality products, 
which was hastened by the Asian economic crisis, brought about new deﬁ  nitions of developmental social 
policy in Korea and Taiwan, and created enough room to accommodate political demands for greater social 
rights. Th   is is an interesting contrast to Singapore and Hong Kong, where the paradigm of economic policy 
was not reset and the politics did not undergo major changes. Th   is explains why these two welfare states 
remain essentially the same as before the economic crisis in these two countries.
Changes in economic structure and redeﬁ  ning developmental social policy
Based on their data analysis of the West European countries, Huber and Stephens (2001) argue that there is 
a clear link between the production regime and the welfare regime that a country may have developed. Th  ey 
also argue that countries with diﬀ  erent production regimes tend to respond to economic challenges with dif-
ferent social policy reforms. Of course, the link is not automatic and it depends on the intermediate political 
process.
Such links have been equally evident in the developmental welfare state in East Asian countries 
since social policy has been used as an instrument for economic development strategies. In order to identify 
the developmental nature of social policy in Korea and Taiwan, it is necessary to examine the ways in which 
economic development was pursued. In this context, we will examine the question as to whether some social 
policy programmes, such as unemployment insurance, which had been regarded as hampering economic 
development, were now understood as developmental as economic restructuring took place.
4  White points out the socioeconomic conditions that are conducive to democracy in the developmental state: a higher 
level of socioeconomic development; a relatively homogenous population; a strong sense of national identity, a cohesive 
social structure; a society lacking in gross inequalities; a vibrant civil society; and a well-developed political party system 
(White 1998).6  DESA Working Paper No. 40
Even though the state played a strategic role in the economic development of all the East Asian 
countries examined in this paper, the role of the state in diﬀ  erent countries was not exactly the same. In Korea 
and Taiwan, the state deliberately intervened in the economic decision making of ﬁ  rms to facilitate industri-
alization of the whole economy, rather than just certain sectors with comparative advantages. Th  e  economic 
development in both countries was set as an overarching goal of public policy. Th   is was related partly to the 
nationalist zeal of the authoritarian leaders—Park Chung-Hee in Korea and Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan—
who ﬁ  rst embarked on the economic development plan in the two countries. It is fair to say that not only 
these political leaders, but also bureaucrats and the public in general regarded economic development as an 
overarching imperative in order to put their countries on an equal footing with the West (Haggard, 1988).
More importantly, the authoritarian governments in both countries attempted to legitimise their 
rule by economic development. Th   is is why Korea and Taiwan took the road to economic development 
through state intervention, instead of letting the market do the job. Amsden (1989) argued that the Korean 
state had intervened in the market mechanism and deliberately distorted market prices in order to compete 
internationally. Th   is is not a unique experience in the history of economic development. What made the 
Korean case diﬀ  erent was the discipline the state exercised over big business, known as chaebol.5 Th  e  Korean 
state imposed performance standards on private ﬁ  rms, and once these standards were met, the state provided 
various kinds of subsidy, for example low-interest capital, allowing businesses to enter new markets or con-
solidate their monopoly status.
Th   e other side of the industrial policy in Korea during the period of rapid economic growth was 
the harsh suppression of trade unions and labour movements. Political suppression was not, however, the 
only measure used to ensure industrial stability and workers’ loyalty. Th   e Park government and the following 
authoritarian governments established a range of policies to enhance the welfare of industrial workers. Th  is  is 
why major social insurance programmes started with large-scale ﬁ  rms such as Industrial Accident Insurance, 
National Health Insurance and the National Pension Programme (Kwon, 1999). A cheap but well-trained 
labour force was an essential requisite for the export-oriented industrialization strategy. In this context, as Yi 
and Lee (2003) argue, vocational training and occupational welfare programmes for workers were promoted 
by the state, which private ﬁ  rms perceived as orders rather than guidelines from the state. Th  ese  occupational 
welfare beneﬁ  ts were very often workplace-based and consequently non-transferable, so that workers’ loyalty 
to ﬁ  rms was ensured.
Th   e role of the state in Taiwan during the period of rapid economic growth is similar to that of Ko-
rea. Wade (1988: 54) explains that the aim of government intervention was not to encourage ﬁ  rms to maxi-
mise proﬁ  tability based on current comparative advantage, but rather to control the composition of national 
investment so that Taiwan could establish a ﬂ  exible and integrated production structure. What was diﬀ  erent 
in Taiwan was that the share of the large conglomerates in the economy was smaller than in Korea and such 
conglomerates were concentrated in the state-controlled strategic industries, such as the China Petroleum 
Corporation. A large share of economic production was undertaken by small- and medium-sized enterprises. 
Th  ese  ﬁ  rms were run by families: the head of the family was often the owner/manager and the other family 
members worked for wages (Hsiung, 1996).
Given the strong authoritarian state, the trade union movements were weak and not perceived by the 
state as a threat to the economic development plan. Labour Insurance, which was one of the ﬁ  rst major social 
5 A  chaebol is a large capitalist organization, usually based on a single family having controlling interests in a variety 
companies, similar to the Japanese Zaibatsu.Transforming the developmental welfare states in East Asia          7
insurance programmes during the development period, was targeted mainly toward industrial workers in 
large-scale ﬁ  rms, and the state sector workers were among those ﬁ  rst covered by health insurance programmes. 
Within these overall economic strategies, social protection for vulnerable people in society was left to families. 
Some social insurance programmes, such as unemployment insurance, were never on the agenda since they 
were perceived as discouraging the work ethic and encouraging dependency on the state. It is also important 
to note that women were doubly burdened in the export-oriented industrialization in both Korea and Taiwan, 
since they were the main providers of cheap labour for industry as well as of welfare for their families.
In Singapore and Hong Kong, social development was not a priority, and as in Taiwan and Korea 
it was subordinated to the overall economic development strategy. Nevertheless, their strategies were diﬀ  er-
ent from those pursued by Korea and Taiwan during the period of rapid economic growth. Th   is resulted in 
a diﬀ  erent structure of the welfare state. Singapore also set economic development as the overriding goal for 
society. Initial conditions soon after independence in 1954 were not favourable for Singapore to undertake 
industrialization projects because of her neighbours such as Indonesia and Malaysia, which were not alto-
gether friendly to Singapore (Singapore was separated from the Malaysian federation in 1965), the multi-
ethnic composition of the population, and the volatility of politics.
Th   e economic strategy of the People’s Action Party was to build a sound infrastructure, to ensure 
workforce compliance, provide generous tax incentives, and allow international capital to completely own 
their business operations (Chua, 2003). In contrast to the strategy of Korea and Taiwan to build a national 
economy with a vertical integration of industries, Singapore attempted to build an international platform 
for industrialization, and left international capital to carry out its own business instead of giving it guidelines 
and punishing it if it did not follow them as in Korea and Taiwan. Th   e Central Provident Fund was central 
to this economic policy. Initially established by the British colonial government to provide lump-sum retire-
ment pensions (Kwon, 1998), it was used as an eﬀ  ective way of capital mobilization. One of the important 
innovations which the Singapore government cleverly devised, was to link the Central Provident Fund to 
housing policy. Chua explains that the Central Provident Fund was a vital part of the capital formation of 
Singapore through its housing programmes. He also points out that improved housing conditions through 
the Central Provident Fund provided permanent shelter, improved sanitation and health conditions, and 
enhanced well-being, which then led to increasing labour productivity (Chua, 2003: 10).
It is, however, important to recognize that this seemingly virtuous circle was based on three very 
authoritarian policies: the Land Acquisition Act of 1966, the Industrial Relations Act of 1968 and the Inter-
nal Security Act of 1958. Th   e Land Acquisition Act allowed the government to acquire any piece of land it 
deemed necessary, which was an eﬀ  ective nationalization of land; the Industrial Relations Act severely cur-
tailed the trade union movements; and the Internal Security Act allowed the government to detain anyone it 
saw as opposing social stability for extendable two-year terms of detention.
Hong Kong pursued a very similar industrialization strategy to that of Singapore during the period 
of rapid economic growth, although the British colonial government had never explicitly declared that it 
had implemented an industrialization policy. In a way, it is fair to say that Hong Kong was the pioneer of 
industrialization strategy through the building of an international entrepôt for trade and ﬁ  nance with some 
export-oriented industries. What was diﬀ  erent in Hong Kong was that it did not have a provident fund like 
Singapore. Th   e provident funds in the British colonies were introduced as part of the decolonization pro-
cess, which was why it was discussed under the last British Governor in Hong Kong, Chris Patten, towards 
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that housing policy was central to social policy as an instrument of economic development. Th  e  Housing 
Authority of the colonial government built numerous rental and home ownership estates. Hong Kong also 
built comprehensive social assistance programmes which were introduced under the auspices of the governor 
David Wilson (Hong Kong Government, 1991). Th   ese programmes were ﬁ  nanced by public revenues. In 
other words, the state was the main provider in ﬁ  nancing welfare programmes, which was unique in East 
Asian welfare states.
Table1. 
Key indicators in four East Asian countries
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Korea GDP growth rate 6.7 5.0 -6.7 10.9 8.8
Unemployment rate 2.0 2.6 6.8 6.3 4.1
Taiwan GDP growth rate 6.1 6.7 4.6 5.4 5.9
Unemployment rate 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.9 3.0
Singapore GDP growth rate 7.6 8.5 0.1 5.9 9.8
Unemployment rate 3.0 2.4 3.2 4.6 4.4
Hong Kong GDP growth rate 11.6 10.5 -6.6 -2.9
Unemployment rate 2.8 2.2 4.7 6.3 5.0
Source: Asian Development Bank (2002)
Despite such diﬀ  erences in economic strategy, East Asian countries were very successful during the 
1970s, 1980s and the ﬁ  rst part of the 1990s. Th   ese developmental strategies were challenged to a great extent 
as these countries became exposed to global competition. Th   is was manifested during the Asian economic 
crisis. As Table1 suggests, the four countries were equally inﬂ  uenced by the economic crisis, and serious 
rethinking in economic policy took place in Korea and Taiwan, while Singapore and Hong Kong basically 
continued the strategy for the international entrepôt of trade and ﬁ  nance. Although it was inevitable that 
Singapore and Hong Kong would be aﬀ  ected by the international economic downturn, there seemed no 
other viable alternatives for them to the current economic strategy of remaining as a centre of international 
trade and ﬁ  nance, given the deepening of global economic integration.
It is true that there has been a critical re-examination of the existing economic paradigm in Singa-
pore and Hong Kong. Both countries now emphasize the importance of building a high-tech and knowl-
edge-based economy, but such new emphasis is still in line with the existing framework of economic devel-
opment. Social policy responses to the economic crisis in Singapore and Hong Kong were also within the 
selective form of the developmental welfare state. During the economic crisis, the Singapore government 
lowered the employer’s contributions to the Central Provident Fund from 20 to 10 per cent, as in 1986. 
Hong Kong introduced the Mandatory Provident Fund in 2000, but it was a pension fund just like the Cen-
tral Provident Fund. In other words, there were no fundamental changes in the developmental welfare state.
In contrast, Korea and Taiwan suﬀ  ered from the structural problems behind the headline indica-
tors. In fact, they were already identiﬁ  ed before the Asian economic crisis. As for Korea, its international 
competitiveness rapidly decreased during the 1990s. As Park (2001) shows, the average increase in wage was 
14.3 per cent, while labour productivity increased by 10.4 per cent during the 1990s. As we pointed out, 
Korean ﬁ  rms provided various company welfare beneﬁ  ts to their workers in order to maintain their loyalty. 
Furthermore, the life-time employment and seniority-based remuneration system remained an implicit con-
tract between employers and employees. Such company welfare beneﬁ  ts were arranged on the basis of low Transforming the developmental welfare states in East Asia          9
wages and weak trade unions. However, once trade unions were allowed to mobilize workers and successfully 
increase the level of wages from the late 1980s, the existing formula of company welfare beneﬁ  ts could not 
be sustained.
Considering that Korea’s economic growth was mainly based on cheap labour costs, the loss of 
international price competitiveness raised a fundamental question about the existing economic strategy and 
the developmental welfare state. Th   is was also prompted by China and other East Asian developing countries 
encroaching on the traditional Korean market. Th   e Korean government saw that the country would need to 
develop a high-technology based economy with a ﬂ  exible labour market, and in 1990 launched the ‘Seven-
Year Development Plan for High-Tech Industry’. Th   e aim of this plan was to bring high technology into 
the Korean economy and make it competitive (Ahn, 1998: 134). Th   e Korean government also set in place 
institutional arrangements necessary for structural adjustment. Th   e inevitable corollary of structural adjust-
ment was to lay oﬀ   workers and staﬀ   in sectors that were no longer competitive. In this context, the Employ-
ment Insurance Programme, which included job-training schemes as well as unemployment beneﬁ  ts, was 
introduced in 1995.
Th   is led to a new deﬁ  nition of ‘developmental social policy’ in Korea and a signiﬁ  cant change in 
social policy: providing beneﬁ  ts to those who are not working and training them outside companies. What 
remains essentially the same is the state’s eﬀ  ort to utilize social policy as an instrument of economic policy. 
Th   e other side of the coin was to reform the labour market so that employers could lay oﬀ   their workers if 
necessary. Th   is was harder to do because Korea had become democratic and the bureaucrats could no longer 
rely on the authoritarian power of the president in passing the controversial programmes through the Na-
tional Assembly.
Taiwan also faced a problem of high labour costs. Before martial law was lifted, trade unions in Tai-
wan were controlled by the state. Once this oppressive law was lifted in 1987, trade union movements and the 
Taiwan Labour Front in particular, started to mobilize workers. Th   ey demanded political freedom and higher 
wages, and the number of strikes increased sharply (Chen, Ko and Lawler, 2003). Th   e response from the gov-
ernment was to promote a capital- and skill-intensive industrial structure instead of a labour-intensive one. As 
in Korea, Taiwan made signiﬁ  cant progress on this front, notably in the information technology (IT) industry.
Th   e Taiwanese employers, however, responded to the rising cost of labour in other ways as well. 
Th   ey started to move their operations to mainland China. As Chen (2003) reports, Taiwanese investment in 
China increased sixteen times during the period from 1991 to 2001. It is true that capital mobility increases 
as global economic integration deepens. For the Taiwanese entrepreneurs, either in a labour- or capital 
intensive industry, China provided an excellent investment opportunity as a cheap labour supplier and an 
enormous market. Th   is, in turn, led to an increase in unemployment in Taiwan.
Th   e unemployment rate was low by international standards, but for the developmental welfare state, 
which was based on full employment without unemployment insurance, it posed a serious challenge. Fur-
ther, it emerged that the unemployed were typically male workers from the manufacturing sectors, and that 
they tended to remain unemployed in the longer term. Th   is suggests that the selective form of the develop-
mental state could not serve the need of the Taiwanese economy. Since the Taiwanese economy escaped the 
domino eﬀ  ect of the ﬁ  nancial crisis because of its huge foreign reserves, policy change was less dramatic than 
in Korea. Th   is does not mean that changes in social policy were less signiﬁ  cant in Taiwan, which also intro-
duced unemployment insurance with a training programme package in 1999.10  DESA Working Paper No. 40
Democratic politics and inclusive social policy
It would be misleading to assume that the politics of the developmental welfare state would automatically 
produce public policy decisions required for economic development, particularly when it was undergo-
ing democratization. Th   e new understanding of ‘developmental’ social policy needed to ﬁ  nd its meaning 
in practice through the political process. At the beginning, however, the Korean government attempted to 
adjust social policy according to the new set of economic goals without building broad political support. For 
example, in March 1997, the Kim Young-sam government passed a bill to revise the Labour Standard Law 
through the National Assembly behind locked doors without opposition members, which had been a typical 
tactic of the authoritarian government to pass the bills it wanted. It aimed to reform the labour market in 
order to make it easier for employers to lay oﬀ   workers. Th   e opposition party, then led by Kim Dae-jung, 
strongly opposed the bill, as did the public. Th   e then governing party, at the last minute, halted the provi-
sion of lay-oﬀ  s in the bill for two years in an eﬀ  ort to gain wider support. Th   is raised serious doubts about 
the ability of the state to carry through its economic reform under democratic politics, which then sparked a 
chain reaction of ﬁ  nancial crisis at the end of 1997.
Th   e economic crisis produced a surprise winner in the presidential election at the end of 1997: 
the long-time opposition leader, Kim Dae-jung. It gave the Korean government another opportunity to 
carry out labour market reform. In February 1998 the President-elect Kim Dae-jung established a tripartite 
committee, the Employees-Employers-Government Committee, to forge a social consensus for reform. It is 
worth noting that the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, which had been subject to harsh suppression 
by the government, participated in this committee as did the Korean Federation of Trade Unions. In other 
words, this committee was able to produce a broad-based social consensus for reform (Kwon, 2003a). Th  e 
committee agreed to the labour market reform, but also recommended that the government implement a 
package of social protection measures for the unemployed, which was later called the ‘Master Plan for Tack-
ling Unemployment’. Th   e Master Plan included, inter alia, the swift extension of the Employment Insurance 
Programme, the implementation of public works projects, and the reinforcement of employment services 
(see Table 2). Th   e training schemes within the Employment Insurance Programme were put into full opera-
tion. Yi and Lee argue that policy emphasis shifted from job security to job capability of workers, according 
to their recipient-centred analysis of the labour market policy (Yi and Lee, 2003).
Since, unlike Korea, Taiwan was not hit by the economic crisis, the policy response was less urgent, 
but built in a similar way on social consensus initiated by the new government. In 2000, the opposition 
candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party, Chen Shui-bian, was elected to the presidency. During the 
campaign, Chen unveiled his labour policies, which departed from the traditional KMT line: further auton-
omy for the trade union movements; re-examination of the privatisation policy of state-owned enterprises; 
Table 2. 
The extension of the unemployment benefi  ts (benefi  t coverage1)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Korea 7.8 26.34 33.1 33.3 44.7
Taiwan n.a. n.a. 13.9 35.9 107.92
Source: Korea Statistical Yearbook and Employment Insurance Review (Korea); Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China and 
Council of Labour Aﬀ  airs (http://dbsi.cla.tw/stat/).
1 Beneﬁ  t coverage refers to proportion of people receiving unemployment beneﬁ  ts among the unemployed.
2 Anomaly may have happened because the unemployment ﬁ  gure is year average and because there are cases in which people 
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and labour-management conferences (Chen, Ko and Lawler, 2003). After the election, the DPP government 
convened the ﬁ  rst ‘National Economic Development and Consultation Conference’ in 2001. Th  e  confer-
ence agreed to reform the three basic labour laws, which were under review at the time of writing this paper 
(Lin, 2003). After this conference in 2003, the Employment Insurance Programme integrated the existing, 
but fragmented unemployment beneﬁ  t and training schemes in 2003 after this conference. In a nutshell, the 
unemployment insurance programme, which was the last programme the developmental welfare state would 
consider for introduction, became a centrepiece of the system in the newly deﬁ  ned ‘developmental’ welfare 
state in Korea and Taiwan.
Although a shift in economic strategy in Korea and Taiwan brought about the new understanding of 
‘developmental’ social policy, it is not the whole story. Under the politics of democratization, there emerged 
advocacy coalitions who pressed their agenda for inclusive social policy. It is also important to note that these 
new advocacy coalitions did not suddenly take on social policy as the opportunities arose. For many years, 
there had existed advocacy coalitions that pursued the goal of an inclusive social policy and attempted to 
change the developmental welfare state in Korea and Taiwan. Th   eir roles in social policy making have often 
been mentioned in passing in the existing literature of comparative social policy, since these actors often 
failed to achieve their policy outcomes under authoritarian politics.
At ﬁ  rst, these advocacy coalitions did not have a very clear idea about inclusive social policy or a 
coherent political strategy to be able to pursue policy outcomes. I have explained that in Korea, the advocacy 
coalition for an inclusive health insurance system did not have a clear idea about social justice, and argued 
that they had to compromise their positions under the authoritarian politics from the early 1960s until the 
late 1980s (Kwon, 2003b). Th  eir  ﬁ  rst serious attempt in 1988 to integrate the health care system, which 
would have included the self-employed and farmers under one national health insurance, failed because 
President Roh vetoed the integration bill initiated by the opposition party. As the advocacy coalition, which 
initially comprised policy experts, extended their network to the grassroots civil societies, bureaucrats and 
politicians, their ideas and political strategy also became coherent. In 1998, when the Kim Dae-jung govern-
ment came to power, this group of people successfully seized key positions in the government and were able 
to integrate National Health Insurance in Korea in 2000. Nevertheless, integration reform was not a clear-
cut victory for the advocacy coalition, since the ﬁ  nancial integration was not completed, while the adminis-
tration side of integration was. Th   is was partly due to the antiquated tax system and strong objections from 
the opposition party in the National Assembly.
Another major breakthrough towards an inclusive social policy was also made by basically the same 
advocacy coalition: the reform of the public assistance programme. During the economic crisis, the existing 
public assistance programme based on a strict means-test idea did not help the poor. Th   e advocacy coalition 
was able to introduce the Minimum Living Standard Guarantee, which recognized the right of every citizen 
to a decent living as a social right. It abolished the so-called family test to provide cash beneﬁ  ts to those who 
have non-poor family members and increased the level of beneﬁ  ts based on the concept of relative poverty 
(Kwon, 2003a). It is worth noting that the reform of the programme was also part of Kim Dae-jung’s politi-
cal strategy to win a majority in the National Assembly in the 2000 general election. Th   e new public as-
sistance programme also includes a range of workfare and training programmes as well as cash beneﬁ  ts. Th  e 
catchword, ‘productive welfare state’, used by the Kim Dae-jung government for the general election (Presi-
dential Oﬃ   ce, 2000), summarized the nature of welfare reform after the economic crisis.12  DESA Working Paper No. 40
National Health Insurance was also an important part of democratization politics in Taiwan. Once 
Tanwai (meaning ‘outside the party’) was allowed as a political party as the Democratic Progress Party in 
1986, the DPP fought elections (initially local elections) on a platform of democratization, Taiwanization 
and social welfare (Lu, 1992). In fact the DPP’s social welfare manifestos turned out to be more eﬀ  ective 
than those of Taiwanization in local elections, as some DPP candidates were successful with policy for old-
age allowances. It was also true that a majority of the Taiwanese wanted to avoid the issue of Taiwanization 
because of military warning from Beijing. In this context, the KMT, the then governing party, decided to 
introduce National Health Insurance in 1995, ﬁ  ve years earlier than planned.
Before the introduction of the universal health insurance programme, only public sector employ-
ees, school teachers and employees in the large-scale ﬁ  rms were covered by the various social insurance 
programmes. Farmers had their own health insurance from 1989, but the majority of the population was 
not covered by any public health insurance. As the DPP began to address the issue, the KMT did not have 
a choice other than to introduce the National Health Insurance (Hwang, 1995), which covered the whole 
population, with the government providing funding for the self-employed, informal sector workers and 
farmers. It was an important departure from the selective form of the developmental welfare state in Taiwan. 
Nevertheless, the KMT government placed an important conditionality on the new National Health Insur-
ance. Th   e government was required to review the administrative and ﬁ  nancing arrangement within ﬁ  ve years 
after its introduction (Ku, 1998). In particular, a multiple carrier system would be considered against the 
current single carrier system.
Th   e KMT government had already started to prepare the National Health Insurance reform as early 
as 1997. Th   e Department of Health drew a policy draft for a health system of multiple insurance carri-
ers. Th   e proposal failed to go through the legislative process contrary to the KMT government’s intention 
in 1999. It was partly due to the factional split of the KMT in the run-up to the Presidential election, but 
Wong (2004) points out that the citizens’ advocacy coalition, the ‘NHI coalition’, was an active player in the 
eﬀ  orts to resist reform. Th   e coalition successfully argued that the multi-insurance carrier reform would bring 
NHI back to a selective and fragmented system.
While the democratic politics in Korea and Taiwan accommodated new ‘developmental’ social 
policies and initiated a universal healthcare system, politics in Singapore and Hong Kong were relatively 
stable. Whether Singapore’s ‘guided’ democracy is democratic or not has been a controversial issue for some 
time. Nevertheless it is important to recognize that the Singapore government has enjoyed what Chua calls 
performance legitimacy from the population (Chua, 2003). Despite the hand-over of sovereignty to China, 
Hong Kong’s politics remains absorbed by the administration. Th   is seems to be the case with an exception 
of the period in which Chris Patten attempted to introduce quasi-democratization before the hand-over. 
Given the political stability, and since there has been no major shift in economic strategy in Singapore and 
Hong Kong, it was not necessary to the economic and social policy paradigm that proved to be successful 
in achieving what it aimed: a platform for a global city of trade and ﬁ  nance, as Ramesh (2003) explains. It 
is worth noting recent protest over the introduction of an anti-subversion law in Hong Kong that showed a 
growing pressure for democratization of politics in Hong Kong, but it is not very clear whether this will lead 
to a signiﬁ  cant democratic reform. It is also worth noting that the overall size of the welfare state has grown 
in response to structural factors such as the ageing of the population in Hong Kong and Singapore.Transforming the developmental welfare states in East Asia          13
Concluding remarks
Th   is paper has argued that the recent reform of the developmental welfare state in Korea and Taiwan was 
mainly due to the shift in the overall goal of economic policy from extensive economic growth to economic 
competitiveness. Th   e economic crisis in 1997-1998 made the reform of the structural weakness of the 
economy inevitable. Th   is paper explained how the welfare state that had focused on those working in the 
large-scale ﬁ  rms now began to protect those not working, including the poor and the elderly as well as the 
unemployed, in line with the economic changes. Within the new social protection schemes, training pro-
grammes as well as unemployment beneﬁ  ts were predominant. In other words, the emphasis was placed on 
the protection of the job capability instead of the job security of workers.
Th   e reform in economic and social policy had to be carried out through democratic politics. Th  e 
newly elected governments in Korea and Taiwan were able to forge a social consensus through tripartite com-
mittees. Th   rough the opportunities arising from the change of governments, the advocacy coalitions for in-
clusive social policy successfully achieved their social policy agenda instead of just accommodating economic 
changes. National Health Insurance, as well as public assistance programmes, in both countries was made 
more inclusive. In short, the change in the overall goal of economic policy, and a shift toward democratic 
politics resulted in making the developmental welfare state more inclusive in Korea and Taiwan.
What remains unchanged is that the social policy is developmental, while social inclusion is now 
considered an equally important social policy goal. In contrast, the developmental welfare states of Singapore 
and Hong Kong have remained largely unchanged in their underlying principle. Th   is paper has argued that 
despite the adverse eﬀ  ects of the Asian economic crisis, Singapore and Hong Kong maintained the overall 
strategy of economic development through international trade and ﬁ  nance, a strategy that seems appropriate 
as global economic integration continues. In terms of politics, the administration still absorbs the politics, 
and there are no serious political challenges to the prevailing order.
Th   e move toward an inclusive developmental welfare state does not mean that the welfare state has 
become as inclusive as in the Scandinavian countries. Th   ere is a whole range of areas of social policy that 
needs to be improved in terms of social inclusion. Despite the changes, the developmental welfare state is 
still gender biased. For example, in Korea, the National Pension Programme, the Employment Insurance 
Programme and Industrial Accident Insurance should include all workers whether they are regular or tempo-
rary. In practice, however, less than half the temporary workers are covered by these programmes while most 
regular workers are within the schemes. Considering that the number of temporary workers has increased 
and that they are more likely to be women, they are not equally protected by the programmes. In Taiwan, 
the government created a number of low-paid jobs for the wives of middle-aged men who had lost their jobs. 
Although the jobs may have compensated for a part of the lost family income, they were likely to double the 
women’s burden: the women now had to work both outside and in the home.
In the areas of social services and social care, there has been little improvement compared to those of 
public assistance, pension, health care and unemployment. Caring for chronically ill people, the bedridden 
elderly and the disabled fell mostly to families, which in turn, meant the women. Th   e absence of improve-
ment in these areas of social policy showed that the welfare state in Korea and Taiwan still places stronger 
emphasis on development than on social inclusion. It is also clear that the improvement of social protection 
depends to a great extent on political mobilization as in the case of health care, which has been the centre of 
political debates in Korea and Taiwan.14  DESA Working Paper No. 40
In the wider context of economic and social development, the recent experiences of Korea and Tai-
wan counter the assertion that social protection should come as an after-thought of economic development. 
More socially inclusive welfare states helped these two countries to come out of the economic crisis without 
much adverse social eﬀ  ects such as a sharp rise of poverty or serious worsening of income inequality. It will be 
useful for the development debate if the idea of the developmental welfare state be explored in the context of 
other developing countries against the tendency that separates social protection from economic development.
In terms of policy implications, in addition to the inclusive welfare reform after the economic crisis, 
I would like to emphasize that Korea and Taiwan had developed social policy institutions in an incremental 
fashion for quite some time, which proved to be a basis for the inclusive reforms, and that those social forces 
which had had frustrating experiences persevered in pursuing their social agenda. Of course, not everything 
is rosy in Korea and Taiwan. For instance, levels of unemployment remain relatively high compared to those 
in the past, and the governments in Korea and Taiwan have struggled to ﬁ  nance the welfare states due to the 
expansion of the programmes. Nevertheless, considering that economic development has been set as a trade-
oﬀ   with social protection and democracy in the development context, the Korean and Taiwanese experiences 
show that it is possible to achieve democracy, economic development and social inclusion at the same time.
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